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The Latin American Cohabitation Boom, 1970-2007
Albert esteve ron lesthAeghe Antonio lópez-gAy in this article we document the often sharp rise in the share of cohabitation in the process of union formation in 13 latin american countries during the last three decades of the twentieth century. we do so by relying on standardized census microdata from the iPumS international database. in many regions within these 13 countries, especially those with large indian and black populations, cohabitation and visiting unions have always existed as alternatives to the formal husband/wife marriage. as our data from three or four census rounds indicate, however, the rise in cohabitation occurred both in areas with "old cohabitation" practices and in areas where cohabitation had remained much more exceptional until the 1970s.
the same census data also document a universally negative cohabitation/education gradient, with women with higher levels of education cohabiting less and entering marriage in greater proportions. on the basis of such negative cross-sectional gradients, one would expect that with advancing education over time, cohabitation would yield to marriage. although the gains in male and female education in latin america since the 1970s have been pronounced, the trends we observed in marriage and cohabitation are the opposite of those that would be predicted on the basis of this cross-sectional education gradient. this finding strongly suggests that other factors favorable to cohabitation have been overlooked.
we explore to what extent economic and ideational factors may be root causes of the trend to more widespread cohabitation. Specifically, we consider the rise of cohabitation as a possible response to the period of hyperinflation in the 1980s and to major attitudinal changes with respect to ethical, religious, and family issues. the latter changes suggest the possibility of a partial convergence of several latin american populations to the pattern of the second demographic transition documented mainly for europe and north america.
we start with a brief historical note on the distinction between traditional and new forms of cohabitation. we then discuss data issues and present data on cohabitation from the 1970 to 2000 census rounds, both for countries as a whole and for some 350 regions. we also focus on the link between the incidence of cohabitation and education, and on the shift in this education gradient over time. we consider both the economic and ideational factors that may account for the observed rise in cohabitation.
Old and new cohabitation in Latin America
the colonization of latin america and the Caribbean produced ethnic mixes, strong and persistent social stratification, and a high degree of heterogeneity in partnership formation.
the indigenous indios had marriage systems that differed from the european Christian pattern. ethnographic descriptions, 1 mostly for the first half of the twentieth century and covering indian populations from mexico to the Southern andes, indicate that many practiced polygamy, with either polygyny or polyandry, exchange of brides, occasional wife-lending, absence of strict rules about premarital sex, and typically brideservice or bridewealth instead of a dowry.
2 with this in mind, it should not come as a surprise that the mestizo populations in colonial times developed partnership patterns based on arrangements other than classic european marriage. this has, for instance, been reflected in historically high levels of "illegitimacy" of births (e.g., Rabell 1992) .
the history of new world black and mulatto or creole populations is very different from that of indios and mestizos because of its the connection with slavery. Black slaves were compelled to observe the rules dictated by plantation owners. european slave owners did not encourage marriages or unions, given the lower labor productivity of pregnant women and mothers. as long as imported slaves were in ample and cheap supply, their owners showed little interest in the natural increase of the estates' slave population. it is in this context that freed or eloped slaves developed the pattern of "visiting unions." in such arrangements, women accepted a male partner for as long as he contributed financially or in kind to household expenditures. Children generally grew up in their mother's household, while the male partner, who might be involved simultaneously in more than one visiting relationship, would not necessarily reside there (Smith 1956; Roberts and Sinclair 1978) . even today male partners may be absent from the household, in which case the mother would appear inaccurately in census statistics as a "false single" or a lone mother.
the white colonial settlers and the upper social classes by contrast adhered to the rules of european Catholic marriage ("Spanish" marriage, or Portuguese nobres marriage), being monogamous and with strong social class endogamy to retain control over assets. However, this european pattern was often complemented by widespread concubinage, either with women of lower social class or with slaves.
the Catholic Church and the latin american states favored the european marriage pattern, but with widespread ambiguity. First, the Catholic parish clergy, especially those in more remote locations, did not strictly observe the celibacy requirement. Second, many Christian and pre-Columbian practices were merged into highly syncretic devotions. the promotion of Christian marriage was therefore mainly the work of those religious orders that followed Catholic doctrine more rigorously. at present, promotion of Christian marriage is vigorously carried out by the new evangelical churches that have been established throughout latin america since the 1950s, most visibly in Brazil.
the role of various latin american states is also often ambiguous. Generally, states copied the european legislation of the colonizing nations and hence "officially" promoted classic european marriage, but more often than not this was accompanied by amendments that recognized consensual unions as a form of common law marriage and allowed equal inheritance rights for children born in such unions. in Brazil, for instance, Portuguese law had promulgated two types of family regulations as early as the seventeenth century (Philippine Code of 1603), namely laws pertaining to the property of notables (nobres) who married in the church and transmitted significant property, and laws pertaining to countryfolk (peões) who did not necessarily marry and continued to live in consensual unions (Borges 1994) . Furthermore, many central governments were often too weak to implement a consistent policy that favored the european marriage pattern. Such ineffectiveness was compounded by the remoteness of many settlements and the lack of interest of local administrations in enforcing centrally enacted legislation.
Such ambiguity in practice notwithstanding, one would be mistaken to assume that this "old cohabitation" was a uniform phenomenon in latin american countries (see also Quilodran 1999) . Quite the opposite is true. in many areas late-nineteenth-and twentieth-century mass european immigration (from Germany, italy, Portugal, and Spain) to the emerging urban and industrial centers of the continent reintroduced the western european marriage pattern characterized by monogamy, institutionally regulated marriage, condemnation of illegitimacy, and low divorce. as a consequence, the european model became a marker of social success and an ingredient in the process of embourgeoisement. this not only caused the incidence of cohabitation to vary widely geographically and as a function of a particular ethnic mix, but also produced the emergence of a marked gradient by educational level and social class: the higher the level of education, the lower the incidence of cohabitation and the higher the incidence of marriage. this negative cohabitation/ education gradient is essentially the result of historical developments, and, as we illustrate below, is found in each of the 13 countries studied here.
By the second half of the twentieth century, in short, the incidence of cohabitation in latin america varied widely, from commonplace in noneuropean ethnic groups or racially mixed groups and in lower social strata, to uncommon among european populations with higher levels of education and mainly belonging to an urban middle class. on the other hand, the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first have seen the growth of "new cohabitation" among groups in which it was extremely rare before, and the expansion of "old cohabitation" among populations that had a long historical tradition in this regard.
The rise in Latin American cohabitation
Data considerations latin american censuses have historically provided an explicit category for consensual unions (uniones libres, uniones consensuales) . examination of the questionnaires of all latin american and Caribbean censuses conducted between the 1960s and 2000s reveals that in the vast majority of them cohabitants could be explicitly identified either through the variables "marital status" (the dominant approach) or "union status" (quite common in Caribbean countries) or through a direct question (e.g., in Brazil and recently in argentina and Suriname).
the individual census records, as used in iPumS, have a number of advantages and disadvantages. among the advantages, they have a large geographical coverage that allows for spatial disaggregation; data can be standardized to facilitate international comparisons; major individual-level covariates such as education are available; and they allow for robust trend estimation. the drawbacks are also considerable. the data pertain only to the current status of the individuals, not to previous circumstances. Hence, there is no information on such categories as ever-cohabited, ever-married, and ever-divorced. in addition, dates of entry into a particular state are not reported, hence no durations can be computed. Finally, the census data are only available at large time intervals, most commonly every ten years. this obviously does not allow for detailed time-series analysis in tandem with economic indicators, such as rates of inflation and unemployment.
there are further methodological problems with census records, such as the problem of "false singles" and "visiting unions." in these instances, women report the presence of their own children in the household, but there is no reference to a male partner. these women have probably been in a union in the past, but it is unclear whether they are now newly single or a partner in a visiting union. in the present analysis such unclear cases have not been added to either numerator or denominator. this is likely to result in an underestimate of the true incidence of cohabitation and visiting unions as combined alternatives to marriage, but in a sufficiently accurate assessment of the incidence of cohabitation only. a similar problem arises when individuals who cohabited in the past, but were no longer in union at the time of the census, report themselves as single (esteve, García, and mcCaa 2011) . this situation clearly exaggerates the proportion of singles and affects the ratio between married and cohabitating couples, especially at ages that are increasingly distant from those in which union formation was more intense. to minimize bias, we focus our analysis on younger ages, mainly 25-29 years, but not on the very young who are just starting to enter unions. 4 a number of researchers (e.g., Ruiz Salguero and Rodriguez vignoli 2011; Rosero-Bixby, Castro martin, and martin Garcia 2009; lopez Ruiz, esteve, and Cabré 2008; Rodriguez 2005; Garcia and Rojas 2002) have used census data to explore cohabitation patterns in latin america. Some of them did so on the basis of iPumS data that have been collected and standardized at the university of minnesota Population Studies Center. estimates of the share of consensual unions were also made by the uS Census Bureau (2004) using the censuses of the 1950s and 1960s and probably other sources as well. these estimates pertain to a more limited number of countries, but we have not been able to locate their original data file.
Previous research based on these uS Census Bureau data (Fussell and Palloni 2004) indicates that the rise in cohabitation most likely started during the 1960s in a number of latin american countries, both those with an initially very low incidence of cohabitation and those with higher levels. note that the cohabitation percentages reported by Fussell and Palloni seem to pertain to all women aged 25-29, whereas the ones we use in this article pertain only to women currently in a union in that age group. Fussell and Palloni's figures are therefore lower than ours. Keeping this distinction in mind, their data indicate that four countries belong to the former category with initially low levels of cohabitation: argentina (5.8 percent cohabitation among all women aged 25-29 in 1950), uruguay (5.7 percent in 1960), Brazil (5.1 percent in 1960), and Chile (3.0 percent in 1970) . Peru (20.9 percent in 1960) and Colombia (13.5 percent in 1960) the data in table 1, which show the marked heterogeneity of latin american countries at the onset, demonstrate that the 1990s in particular witnessed an acceleration of an already upward trend in cohabitation. during the 1960s (1970 census round) the share of cohabitation among all women aged 25-29 in a union varied between about 5 and 15 percent in countries with low levels of old cohabitation (Chile, Brazil, Puerto Rico, argentina). a substantial rise in cohabitation during the 1990s (2000 census round) increased these percentages to levels between 25 and 42 percent. the 1990s were equally significant for a number of countries that were in the middle range at the 1970 census round. this is particularly true for Colombia, where the share of cohabitation for women aged 25-29 jumps from about 20 percent in 1973 to almost 50 in 1993 and over 65 in 2007. less spectacular but equally noteworthy are the rises in mexico and Costa Rica, where the cohabitation shares initially remained fairly stable around 15 percent, but increased during the 1990s by 7 and 16 percentage points respectively. among the countries with 30 percent or more cohabitors among women 25-29 in unions in the 1970s census round (i.e., among those with sizable categories of old cohabitation), remarkable rises took place during the last decade of the twentieth century. Clear examples are venezuela, where the share of cohabiting young women rose from 37 percent in 1990 to 52 percent in 2000, and Peru with a jump from 43 percent to 70 percent over the same decade. only for the paradigmatic case of old cohabitation-Panama-is there a more modest rise during the 1990s, from 53 to 63 percent. at the other end of the distribution, Puerto Rico remains the most conservative country in our sample, but for the year 2000 an estimated share of cohabitation of more than 20 percent for women aged 25-29 would not be unrealistic.
taken together, in the 2000 census round six out of 13 countries had shares of cohabitation in excess of 40 percent for women aged 25-29, and nine out of 13 had equally large shares for men aged 25-29. in the 1990 census round only four countries (including Cuba) had shares exceeding 40 percent for either men or women aged 25-29, and in 1970 presumably only one (Panama).
Census estimates of the shares of cohabitation among women 25-29 are also available for geographic regions (or even municipalities of Colombia) of the various countries. For most countries the number of regions remains largely the same over the entire period of observation (see table 2), except for Brazil, where the spatial resolution improves starting from 26 regions in 1970 to 135 smaller ones subsequently. there are no regional data for Puerto Rico, whereas Cuba and Bolivia contribute information only for the 2000 census round.
table 2 documents the rise in cohabitation by counting the number of regions that exceed the thresholds of 20 percent and 50 percent of cohabiting women among all women aged 25-29 currently in a union. none of the 13 regions in Chile had reached the level of 20 percent in the first three censuses.
But at the time of the 2000 census, 9 of these 13 regions had crossed that threshold. in Brazil, only 22 of 133 regions had passed the lower threshold of 20 percent in 1980. By 2000, virtually all of them had done so, and 29 had already passed the much higher threshold of 50 percent in cohabitation rather than marriage. the movement in argentina is very similar: in the 1970 census round, 8 of 23 regions had cohabitation shares of 20 percent or more, and by 2000 all regions had crossed that lower threshold. Furthermore, 4 regions had crossed the threshold of more women aged 25-29 in cohabitation than in marriage. the rise in mexico is less pronounced, but 20 of the 32 regions had a share of cohabitation above 20 percent in 2000, compared with only 8 in 1970 and 1990. of all countries, the most striking rise in cohabitation seems to have occurred in Colombia. in 1970 only 2 regions of 27 had more cohabiting than married young women, and 12 regions had not even crossed the 20 percent threshold. But by 2000, all 33 regions had passed the upper threshold of 50 percent.
as we noted earlier, both countries with low or moderate levels of old cohabitation in 1970 or 1980 and those with high levels witnessed rises. these latter countries were already above the lower threshold of 20 percent, and for them it is the upper threshold that is of relevance. in venezuela 16 of 24 regions had crossed the 50 percent mark in 2000, compared with only 3 a decade earlier. over the same decade the figure in Peru jumped from 8 to 24 of the country's regions. Finally, 10 regions in Cuba had joined that group by 2000, as had all 11 regions in Panama. the full distribution of regional levels by country is shown in Figure 1 using boxplots. For those countries with two such measurements, only Panama shows no marked further upward shift of the distribution of regions.
another telling way to describe the data is to rank the regions by level of cohabitation as measured at the earliest date and to see how they increase over subsequent decades. this is done for ten countries in Figure 2 . in addition, a straight line was fitted through the provincial data points for each census. the lines are essentially parallel in Costa Rica and Brazil, indicating that all regions had similar absolute increases in percentages cohabiting, irrespective of their earlier position in the distribution. most of the other countries have the higher increments in regions that were at the lower end to start with, which indicates that the overall rise is attributable to a slightly greater extent to new rather than to old cohabitation. the main exception is Chile, where the increases between the 1990 and 2000 censuses are greatest for the areas that had higher cohabitation shares to start with.
Finally, appendix The education gradient in cohabitation we have noted that the negative cross-sectional gradient of cohabitation with rising female education is a historical reflection of ethnic and social class differentials. that negative slope is found in all countries considered here, and as the top part of Figure 3 shows, this was already clearly the case before the sharp post-1970 rise in cohabitation. the existence of a positive or negative education gradient has often been used to explain trends in fertility or other phenomena.
6 if we had used the typical latin american cohabitation/education gradient in combination with changes in educational attainment over time to project the incidence of cohabitation, we would have been wide of the mark. as it turns out, female educational levels rose sharply over the three decades in all countries examined here. in an analysis not shown, we created boxplots for each country to show the distribution of regions with respect to their percentages of women these major improvements in educational levels during the last two or three decades of the twentieth century in combination with the negative educational gradient of cohabitation would lead us to expect a drop in the incidence of cohabitation over time. of course, just the opposite has happened. evidently, other unidentified factors must have fostered a rise in cohabitation while neutralizing the effect of rising education. Proof of the existence of such factors lies in the observation that cohabitation has been rising over time among women in all education groups, and sometimes more among bettereducated women than among the less-educated. the fact that all social classes have seen a rise in cohabitation is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3 . in 1970, no country had more than 10 percent cohabitation among all women 25-29 living in a union and with more than complete secondary education. the last census round recorded nine such countries, and better-educated women now have cohabitation shares exceeding 30 percent in argentina, Colombia, Cuba, and Peru. even more striking is that the starkest contrast in 1970 was between women with less than primary education and all other women. in the 2000 census, this contrast has given way to a more gradual slope as a result of increases in cohabitation among the middle educational groups, who now form the majority of the population.
we now turn to the question of what has caused this rise in cohabitation across educational groups in latin america.
Explaining the rise in cohabitation a useful approach for analyzing a new form of behavior is the "ready, willing, and able" (Rwa) framework used by Coale (1973) to interpret the historical european fertility transition, and elaborated by lesthaeghe and vanderhoeft (2001) to incorporate heterogeneity and the time dimension. the "readiness" condition states that the new form of behavior must offer an economic or psychological advantage, hence it refers to the cost/benefit calculus of a particular action compared to its alternatives. the "willingness" condition, by contrast, refers to the religious and/or ethical legitimacy of the new behavior. and the "ability" condition states that a technological or legal means must be available to permit the realization of that innovation.
in the instance of cohabitation, a number of economic advantages are easily identified. First, compared to legal marriage, cohabitation is an "easy in, easy out" solution. this implies, more specifically, that 1) considerable costs are saved by avoiding more elaborate marriage ceremonies, 2) parents and relatives or friends are presented with the outcome of individual partner choice as a fait accompli, and 3) the exit costs from cohabitation, both financial and psychological, are considerably lower than in the case of a legal divorce. in short, cohabitation is a quicker and cheaper road to both sexual partnership and economies of scale.
7 and in many instances, such short-term advantages may outweigh the firmer long-term commitment offered by marriage.
in addition to these general economic advantages, the rise in cohabitation can also be a response to the economic downturns of the 1980s and the slow subsequent recovery of the 1990s. Potential couples in these instances could postpone entry into a union of any type. alternatively they could opt for the easier and cheaper version and therefore choose cohabitation. moreover, the transition from cohabitation to marriage could be delayed and even forgone as a result of unfavorable economic circumstances. the latter two instances would lead to a rise in the share of cohabitation among all persons in a union.
within the Rwa framework, a basic change in the readiness condition, as described above, would not be sufficient. Concomitant changes in the other two conditions are equally necessary. in the latin american context, we would therefore expect to identify major cultural changes as well, particularly related to ethics and morality, thereby lifting the stigma on certain forms of behavior, including cohabitation. most likely, such changes are accompanied by further secularization and by changes in attitudes toward gender relations.
we address the readiness and willingness conditions in the next two sections. discussion of the ability condition, which would require a detailed study of legal provisions and changes affecting the status of consensual unions, is beyond the scope of the present study. Suffice it to say that national differences in trends related to cohabitation can also be the result of differences or shifts in such legal and institutional factors (cf. vassallo 2011).
Cohabitation as a response to economic shocks latin america has been characterized by both widespread social and economic inequalities and turbulent macroeconomic performance. after a period of dictatorships, a number of latin american countries "re-democratized," but policies aimed at diminishing the large differentials in standards of living resulted in inflation and outbursts of hyperinflation (Bittencourt 2010) . attempts at income redistribution during this "populist" phase were conducted through unfunded public deficits, which led to massive inflation, and ultimately to even greater inequality as the poor were affected more than the rich. in such instances the benefits of economic development realized before 1980 were often lost. the timing, duration, and severity of the period of hyperinflation varied considerably from country to country. Roughly speaking, we can identify two distinct patterns. the first was characterized by a very long period of inflation, but at peak annual levels during the 1980s that were generally below 30 percent. the second pattern is a short period of inflation of such high intensities that money became worthless overnight. Peak levels of 1000 percent inflation in a given year were common (Singh et al. 2005 ; adsera and menendez 2011). obviously, the effect of such inflation spikes is felt for many years-in the latin american case, well into the 1990s. examples of long-term high inflation are Chile (already starting in the allende period) and Colombia. Peaks of 30 percent were recorded respectively in 1985 and 1990 (Singh et al. 2005, p. 4) . examples of virulent hyperinflation are Brazil (2950 percent in 1990), argentina (3080 percent in 1989), and especially Peru (7490 percent in 1990) and Bolivia (11,750 percent in 1985) . mexico is an intermediate case with two peaks in the 1980s, one of 100 percent in 1983 and another of 132 percent in 1987 (ibid.). Such figures provide ample reason to advance the thesis that economic and political conditions in latin america have been primary causes of the rise in the share of cohabitation in overall union formation.
we mention three caveats regarding this explanation, however. as argued by Fussell and Palloni (2004) , ages at first union remained remarkably stable throughout the second half of the twentieth century and show a surprisingly low elasticity to such economic disturbances. the authors pose the following question: "the joint occurrence of an unusually rapid fertility decline and a traditional nuptiality regime quite resistant to changes poses a problem. How can one explain their coexistence?" (p. 1201). in response they assert that economic conditions facilitated the fertility decline, but that, "as it has been for many centuries, the marriage and kinship system in latin america continues to provide a system of nonmonetary exchange that parallels rather than competes with market systems" (p. 1211).
in their opinion, therefore, the nuptiality system would provide a buffer against economic hardship, for both elites and the majority of the population. But their research focuses on the stable ages at first union, not on the shift from marriage to cohabitation. viewed from the latter perspective, much more "internal" change took place within the nuptiality system, and it remains possible that the turbulent economic events of the 1980s and early 1990s are at least partially responsible for the shift from marriage to cohabitation. our second caveat concerns the timing of both features, inflation and the rise of cohabitation. in two of the countries considered here, Brazil and Colombia, the largest increase in percentages cohabiting occurred during the 1970s, well before the economic shocks of the 1980s. during the 1980s, these percentages continued to grow, but in two different inflation regimes. the Brazilian hyperinflation peak of almost 3000 percent occurred in 1990, by which time the cohabitation share for women aged 25-29 had nearly tripled from some 8 percent to 22 percent (see table 1 ). in Colombia, the 1980s inflation peak was much lower, at 33 percent, and long-term inflation was low by latin american standards-16 percent per annum for the second half of the twentieth century (adsera and menendez 2011, p. 40 ). Yet Colombia experienced the most pronounced increase in cohabitation, from around 20 percent in 1970 to almost 50 percent before the 1990 inflation maximum.
the two countries with the largest increments in cohabitation in the 1980s are argentina and Puerto Rico. the former saw a hyperinflation peak of over 3000 percent in 1989 and average annual inflation rates for the 50 years prior to 2003 of 184 percent (ibid.). Puerto Rico, by contrast, experienced nothing comparable to argentinean inflation levels, yet still recorded a noticeable rise in cohabitation before 1990. in five of the countries considered here (Chile, Costa Rica, ecuador, mexico, and venezuela), the largest increment in the share of cohabitation among all unions occurred in the 1990s (see table 1)-that is, during the restabilization of the economy. of these countries Chile had an earlier hyperinflation peak of 504 percent during the 1970s in addition to a more modest rise in the 1980s. the other four countries had more modest peaks between 90 and 130 percent, and also more modest inflation, averaging below 20 percent per annum over the second half of the twentieth century (ibid.). Yet, Chile does not have the steepest rise in cohabitation by the year 2000, and cohabitation shares among women 25-29 in a union are still below 40 percent in all regions of that country (see Figure 2) . the conclusion from these comparisons is the absence of a clear correlation between the timing and rise in cohabitation on the one hand, and the timing of inflation peaks or the overall rate of inflation on the other. admittedly, a more precise time-series analysis is not possible since annual cohabitation rates, unlike marriage rates, cannot be computed. the entry into a consensual union is by definition an unrecorded event. the most one can say is that inflation and hyperinflation may have been general catalysts that strengthened the trend in the shift from marriage to cohabitation, but other causes must have been present as well.
as a final caveat, census figures for 2010 are needed to ascertain whether the upward trend in cohabitation has continued even though average inflation rates are generally much lower for the 2000 decade than before. in fact, if inflation had been the prime driving force of the cohabitation boom, then a return to formal marriage should be expected under the restored conditions of low inflation over the last decade. However, such a return to the ex ante situation seems unlikely.
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Lifting the stigma: Cohabitation and ideational change as the "ready, willing, and able" framework posits, the switch to higher shares of cohabitation in all strata of the population would not have occurred had a major stigma against cohabitation existed among certain segments of the population. Hence, the "willingness" condition must have changed in the direction of greater tolerance. Responses to the world values Surveys indeed suggest the occurrence of a major change in crucial features of the ideational domain. we now turn to that evidence. the european (evS) and world values Surveys (wvS) have a long tradition, often going back to the 1980s, of measuring major ethical, religious, social, and political dimensions of the cultural system. most latin american countries have only one wave of the wvS, and a single cross-section is inadequate for our purposes. moreover, unlike the evS, the wvS measures current cohabitation only ("living as married") but fails to record the "ever-cohabited" state, thereby confounding married persons with and without cohabitation experience.
9 this shortcoming complicates the analysis of a single cross-section, since the selection over the various household formation strategies as a function of differences in values cannot be pursued adequately.
10
For three latin american countries with large shares of post-1960s new cohabitation, we can at least follow the trend over an interval of 15 years. argentina and Brazil had wvS waves in 1991 and 2006 , and Chile in 1990 and 2006 , with a subset of questions repeated across the two surveys. Responses to several of these questions are of particular relevance for our purposes since they shed light on the changes occurring in the various age groups in values pertaining to ethics, secularization, and gender relations.
in a separate analysis (not shown), we assembled for three broad age groups and both sexes the wvS results for the 1990-91 and 2006 waves with respect to five ethical issues, four items measuring secularization, and four dealing with the family and gender relations. the results within each country vary relatively little for these categories: the changes occur in all age groups and in both sexes. the results for women (all age groups) for selected items that are the most relevant for our interpretation of cohabitation give a clear first idea of the order of magnitude of the cultural shifts that have taken place. Figure 4 displays the percentages of wvS respondents in argentina, Brazil, and Chile who consider euthanasia, homosexuality, and divorce as "never justified." in addition the figure shows the percentages agreeing with the statements that "marriage is an outdated institution" and "children need a home with both a father and a mother."
By far the largest change noted in all three countries is the increase in tolerance toward homosexuality. the percentages who consider this as "never justified" are halved or, as in Chile, have been reduced to a third or even a quarter of their 1990 levels. a similar increase in tolerance can be noted with respect to euthanasia. the increase occurs in all three countries, among both sexes and in all age groups. the change is again most pronounced in Chile. the reductions in percentages stating that divorce is never justified are more modest by comparison with the previous two items, but are still substantial and found in all three countries. among the five ethical issues (not shown), only the attitudes toward abortion show a mixed picture, with greater tolerance emerging in Chile, but not in argentina and Brazil. the latter exception notwithstanding, the world values Survey data clearly indicate that pervasive changes in attitudes have taken place during the last two decades in favor of greater tolerance toward forms of behavior that were largely proscribed earlier. this cultural change is entirely in line with what the theory of the second demographic transition predicted. also shown in Figure 4 are the results for two classic attitudinal items regarding family and gender. the results for Chile are again the most striking and in line with the expected trend: a sharp increase for men and women of all ages who consider marriage an outdated institution and a parallel decrease of respondents considering that a child needs both a father and mother. the results for argentina follow the Chilean pattern, but with more moderation. the increase in the percentages considering marriage an outdated institution is just as large, but argentineans are still more likely to believe that a child needs both a father and mother. the Brazilian results with respect to the two family items are mixed: there is no increase in the percentages considering marriage an outdated institution, and even a drop among female respondents, but we find a systematic reduction in percentages believing that a child needs both a father and mother.
not shown in Figure 4 are the responses dealing with religion and secularization. we considered three aspects: church attendance, roles of the church, and individual prayer. in all instances we measured the percentages 
Marriage is an outdated institution
Child needs a home with father and mother NOTE: Detailed results by sex and broad age groups are available upon request for the items in both Figure 4 and who are at the secular end of the spectrum (no attendance, church provides no answers, no prayer). the results for the four items are very clear for Chile: secularization has advanced to a remarkable degree, and the trend is entirely in line with those described above for ethical issues. the evidence for argentina is more attenuated. we noted a major increase in non-attendance at church, but a much more modest increase in doubts about the church's ability to address family issues and in men reporting no moments of private prayer or meditation. By contrast, the church's capacity to address social problems seems not to have suffered in argentina. the outcome in Brazil differs substantially from the other two countries: the trend toward greater ethical tolerance is not matched by advancing secularization. Compared to the 1990 wvS, the 2006 survey indicates declining percentages of persons never or rarely attending church and declining percentages of those doubting the role of the church. in fact, we find a clear rise in the proportions thinking that the church has a role to play in family matters. only the percentages without moments of prayer and meditation have not changed in any significant direction. overall, the absence of indications of growing secularization in Brazil stands in sharp contrast to international trends.
11 Rise in "marriage an outdated institution" t, F t, f t, F decline in "child needs a home with both t, F t, F t, F father and mother" decline in "being housewife just as fulfilling" t, F t, F t, F decline in "priority to men if jobs are scarce" t, f t, F t an overview of outcomes for all 13 attitudinal trends is given in table 3. we have coded the presence of a strong trend that is consistently observed among both sexes and in virtually all age groups as "t" and the presence of a weak or no trend as "t." Similarly, "F" indicates that the trend takes the direction that one would expect on the basis of the theory of the second demographic transition, whereas "f" signals the lack of such a fit.
our question of what previously unidentified factors caused the rise in cohabitation can now be partially answered. the ethical dimension, far more than any other values dimension, has undergone very large shifts during the period under consideration. this finding lends strong support to the thesis that tolerance for various types of non-conformist behavior, including the rise of new cohabitation in argentina, Brazil, and Chile, has increased quite sharply and that, as a consequence, the "willingness" condition in the Rwa framework has ceased to be a limiting factor. in other words, it is reasonable to assume that the stigma against cohabitation among better-educated individuals has been lifted in tandem with the de-stigmatization of euthanasia, homosexuality, divorce, and suicide.
obviously other changes that remain undocumented here could also have contributed to creating more favorable "readiness" and "willingness" conditions for the rise in latin american cohabitation. But at least it is becoming clear that a cultural shift is a necessary-even if not a sufficientingredient of a more complete explanation.
Discussion
the reconstruction of the share of cohabitation in the process of union formation among both men and women in some 350 latin american regions indicates that a substantial rise in cohabitation has occurred since the 1960s in some instances, and with an accelerating rise during the 1990s in most cases. this is particularly true in countries that had relatively low levels of old or traditional cohabitation with a historical ethnic background. Hence, a sizable part of the boom is the result of new cohabitation. moreover, the negative cohabitation/female education gradient has been alleviated over time since the rise in cohabitation affected all educational categories, with the middle educational groups and the better-educated catching up to a significant extent.
this raises the question whether this feature signals a partial convergence of latin american countries to the european pattern of the second demographic transition. discussion of this question has emerged in the latin american literature (e.g., Rojas 2002, 2004; Castro martin 2002; Cabella, Peri, and Street 2004; Rodriguez vignoli 2005; Quilodran 2008 Quilodran , 2011 Binstock 2008; Covre-Sussai and matthijs 2010; Castro martin and Puga 2008; Castro martin et al. 2011; Salinas and Potter 2011; diaz 2011) . we offer two arguments in favor of such a convergence. First, on the basis of both the negative cross-sectional gradient with education and the steep rise in female education, one would expect the share of marriage, rather than the share of cohabitation, to gain importance. Second, for three major countries with a sizable increase in new cohabitation (argentina, Brazil, and Chile) data from two rounds of the world values Surveys show major changes in the direction of greater tolerance for previously proscribed behavior or actions, such as euthanasia, homosexuality, and suicide. moreover, shifts in several other attitudes in favor of greater secularism, non-conformist family arrangements, and more egalitarian gender relations emerged during the 15-year interval between the two rounds of the wvS. these ideational changes, particularly those related to ethical issues, indicate that the rise in cohabitation has developed in a context of growing individual autonomy and greater overall tolerance.
although our findings on the ideational factors do not exclude the possibility that the rise in latin american cohabitation was equally a response to the turbulent economic conditions of the 1980s and early 1990s, we found no clear indications of correlation between these phenomena. Some countries recorded a significant rise in cohabitation before the economic shocks, while others manifested no clear match between the size of the hyperinflation peaks or the average rate of inflation and the extent or pace of rising cohabitation.
the spread of cohabitation and of parenthood among cohabitants-or the "non-conformist transition"-is not the only hallmark of the second demographic transition. the other major ingredient is the "postponement transition," with the shift to older ages of both nuptiality and fertility. in western and northern europe, the non-conformist and the postponement transitions occurred more or less simultaneously. in advanced asian industrial societies, the postponement of marriage and fertility preceded the hitherto modest increase in cohabitation by three decades. a similar timing gap was witnessed in Southern europe (lesthaeghe 2010). the latin american experience may just be the illustration of the reverse, with the non-conformist transition preceding the postponement one. if that proposition holds, we should now anticipate rising ages at first birth and further drops in fertility to below replacement level (cf. Rosero Bixby et al. 2009 ).
lastly, we emphasize that cohabitation rose in most social strata, and in countries and areas with and without traditional forms of old cohabitation alike. this seems to indicate that more specific factors, in addition to the more general ones considered here, could be at play in each of these settings. For instance, in which contexts do newly formed cohabiting couples continue to live with parents or other relatives in extended households, and in which settings do they more closely resemble the european model of neolocal trial marriage? Further scrutiny of such context-specific factors is warranted to achieve a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. 1 See the murdock-white Ethnographic Atlas and the Yale Human Relations area files.
2 Compared to the european marriage pattern, these features put the indigenous populations squarely on the other side of Goody's divide (Goody 1976 ) based on the patterns of exchange of women and property. among the Indios, women mostly brought in benefits for their own kin upon marriage, in contrast to the mostly eurasian populations where they removed property from their kinship group ("diverging devolution" of wealth in Goody's term). in the latter case, the status of women is lowered and kinship groups resort to social class or lineage endogamy to retain some control over property removed by women through marriage.
3 See Borges (1994) and Beierle (1999) on the Bahia upper class in Brazil, and a. twinam (1999) for various Spanish-speaking populations.
4 age at union formation has remained remarkably stable in latin america during the last few decades. this implies that young cohorts increasingly substitute non-marital cohabitation for marriage without substantially modifying the timing of union formation. Because we observe similar proportions of individuals in union by age over time, the rise of cohabitation among individuals aged 25-29 cannot be explained by changes in the timing of union formation. 5 the information for regions within countries is also available in the form of colored maps and cartograms with areas of regions proportional to population size. the cartograms illustrate the importance of large urban areas and reduce that of sparsely populated regions. See «http://www.ced.uab.es/ worldfam/ papers.html».
6 Perelli-Harris and colleagues (2010, 2011) inferred from the similar cross-sectional negative educational gradient of fertility among cohabiting women in Russia that the rise in out-of-wedlock fertility is related not to changing values predicted by the second demographic transition but rather to increasing disadvantage among the less-educated segments of the population. they contend that "non-marital childbearing in Russia has more in common with the pattern of disadvantage in the united States than with the second demographic transition" (2011: 343). Further, they write, "the educational gradient can provide information on how and why a particular behavior increases over time " (2010: 775) . the authors fail to point out that the world values Surveys of 1990 Surveys of , 1995 Surveys of , and 2006 for Russia show substantial attitudinal changes similar to those we document below in three latin american countries (e.g., the growing tolerance for homosexuality and euthanasia, and the changing role of women). Perelli-Harris and colleagues failed to take these trends into consideration. nor did they examine the extent to which the living conditions of individuals within their educational categories deteriorated or improved in recent decades. Finally, the explanations that have been juxtaposed (economic disadvantage versus Sdt) are not mutually exclusive. all of this amounts to the invalidation of their conclusion.
7 Recent data from mexico show that the entry into cohabitation usually occurs after much shorter periods of courtship than entry into marriage (Rabell Romero and murillo lopez 2009: 330) . 9 that problem is particularly important for countries where much cohabitation is of the "new" type. these countries are more similar to the european ones, for which the inclusion of the "ever-cohabited" question in the evS revealed sharp contrasts in values orientations between married persons who Notes a l b e r t e s t e v e / r o n l e s t h a e g h e / a n t o n i o l ó p e z -g ay 10 the analysis by Salinas and Potter (2011) of the Chilean data gathered from new mothers in maternity wards suffers precisely from such a confounding effect by considering currently married women instead of splitting these among those with and without earlier cohabitation experience. the authors found no significant differences in a series of ethical items by currently married versus cohabiting status, and concluded that this was evidence for refuting the hypothesis of the second demographic transition. the lack of such a difference is to be expected when the heterogeneous category of currently married women is compared to currently cohabiting ones. also greater similarity between currently married and currently cohabiting women is likely to result from the fact that the entire sample consists of new mothers interviewed in maternity wards. Parenthood makes values more conservative for everyone (see lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004). Furthermore, no timeseries data are presented on the ethical items, despite these being available online for the Chilean wvS rounds of 1990 and 2006. our results below for a random sample (rather than a highly selective one) show that large ideational shifts in ethical items occurred in Chile between 1990 and 2006. 11 this finding raises the question whether the influence of evangelical churches in Brazil has hindered the overall trend toward secularization or whether other factors are operative.
